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TORTS-DAMAGES-UNDER NEW JERSEY'S WRONGFUL DEATH ACT, AN
AWARD OF THE PECUNIARY VALUE OF THE PARENTS' Loss OF
THEIR CHILD'S COMPANIONSHIP, ADVICE AND
GUIDANCE Is APPROPRIATE.
Green v. Bittner (N.J. 1980)
While on a date in the spring of her senior year at high school,
Donna Green was killed in an automobile accident.1 Her parents and
minor siblings brought an action for her wrongful death under New
Jersey's Wrongful Death Act.2 The defendant was found liable for
Ms. Green's death, and a separate trial was held to determine damages.3
At that trial, the jury was instructed that Ms. Green's survivors could be
compensated for any pecuniary losses they suffered because of her death,
4
I. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 3, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980). Donna was
described as 'everybody's daughter'; a level-headed and dependable young
woman, hard-working and conscientious both at home and at school. Id. at
3-4, 424 A.2d at 211.
2. Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211. The pertinent section of New Jersey's
Wrongful Death Act provides in part:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from
the injury, the person who would have been liable in damages for
the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured ....
2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31-1 (West 1952). For the full text of the Wrongful
Death Act, see 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-1 to 31-6 (West 1952 & Supp. 1980-
1981).
9 . 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.3d at 211. With respect to damages, the New
Jersey Wrongful Death Act provides:
In every action brought under the provisions of this chapter the
jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with
reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to-
gether with the hospital, medical and funeral expenses incurred for
the deceased, to the persons entitled to any intestate personal prop-
erty of the decedent.
2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31-5 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
4. 85 N.J. at 5, 424 A.2d at 212. The trial court charged the jury that
its assessment of damages, in accordance with § 31-5 of the Wrongful Death
Act, was to reflect only past, present and future pecuniary losses to the
survivors, including any direct financial contributions that the decedent
might have made, but was not to include compensation for grief and senti-
mental losses. As to the losses sustained by the decedent's minor broth-
ers and sisters, the judge stated that the jury should consider the service,
assistance, guidance and training afforded them by the decedent, as well as
the probabilities of whether and how long the decedent would have con-
tinued to have made such contributions. Id. at 5-6, 424 A.2d at 212. With
regard to the parents' losses, the trial judge explained that the jury should
consider the household services, such as babysitting and cleaning, that the
decedent had performed in the past, and the likelihood of any additional
household chores which she would have undertaken had she lived. Id.
(224)
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but that this sum should be offset by what it would have cost Ms. Green's
parents to support her until her majority.5 The jury returned a verdict
of no damages.6 The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on damages was
denied,7 and, on appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
Division affirmed.8
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for a
new trial on the issue of damages,9 holding that in a wrongful death
action brought for the death of a child, the jury should be allowed,
under appropriate circumstances, to award damages for the pecuniary
value of the parents' loss of their child's companionship, advice and
guidance as they grow older. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210
(1980).
In the landmark English case of Baker v. Bolten,1° Lord Ellen-
borough established the rule that in a civil court the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury." Consequently, it was
to the defendant's benefit to kill the victim rather than to merely injure
him.'2 This anomalous result was changed by the passage of the Fatal
Accidents Act of 1846,18 more commonly known as Lord Campbell's
Act.14 Although the language of the Act, as it related to damages,
5. Id. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212. From the value of the decedent's household
services, the jury was instructed to deduct what it would have cost to feed,
clothe, and educate the decedent until her majority. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The trial judge concluded that a clear and convincing miscarriage
of justice had not occurred, since it would have been reasonable for the
jury to conclude that the value of the decedent's household services, such as
babysitting and drying dishes, was exceeded by the cost to the family of
feeding, clothing and educating her. Id. He noted that the jury followed
the literal language of the statute in reaching its decision. Id. The judge
further commented that it is unusual for a jury to return a verdict of no
recovery. Id.
8. Id. The denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was affirmed in
an unreported opinion. Id.
9. Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211. Chief Justice Wilentz, joined by Justices
Sullivan, Pashman, Schreiber, Handler and Pollock, delivered the opinion
of the court. Justice Clifford did not participate.
10. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
11. Id.
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
Prosser refers to the familiar legend, quite unfounded, that "this was the
original reason that passengers in Pullman car berths rode with their heads
to the front" and that "fire axes in railroad coaches were provided to enable
the conductor to deal efficiently with those who were merely injured." Id.
at 902 n.43.
13. See Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c.93. The Act provided
for compensatory damages and the jury was to award such damages as it
felt were "proportioned to the injury resulting from such death." Id. at
c.93, § 2.
14. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902.
1981-82]
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supported a broad construction, 15 it was soon held that damages for fatal
accidents should be limited to pecuniary losses. 16
Every American state currently has a wrongful death statute,' 7 and
most are modeled after Lord Campbell's Act.'8 And as with Lord
Campbell's Act, most American statutes have been interpreted to limit
recovery to pecuniary loss.19 The most common element of damages for
the death of a minor is the contribution which he would have made in
the form of earnings or services from the date of death, or, infrequently,
from the date of injury, until he would have reached his majority.
20
This amount is reduced by the probable expense of rearing the child
during that period.21 In addition to recovery for contributions which a
child would have made during his minority, a majority of states allow
parents to recover for the contributions of earnings or services which
the parents might reasonably have expected from the child after his
majority.
22
15. See note 13, supra.
16. See Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852). The
Blake court was concerned with the difficulty of evaluating the intangible
emotional injuries resulting from a wrongful death. id. at 42.
17. For a state-by-state analysis, see Belfance, The Inadequacy of Pecuniary
Loss as a Measure of Damages in Actions for the Wrongful Death of Chil-
dren, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 543 (1979); Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrong-
ful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 197 (1971).
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902. New Jersey's original wrong-
ful death statute was a virtual copy of Lord Campbell's Act.
19. See W. PRossER, supra note 12, at 907. Pecuniary loss has been
defined as the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the con-
tinued life of the deceased. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (5th ed. 1979).
See, e.g., Butler v. Steck, 146 Conn. 114, 148 A.2d 246 (1959); Hooper Const.
Co. v. Drake, 73 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1954); Denton v. Midwest Dairy Products
Corp., 284 Ill. App. 279, 1 N.E.2d 807 (1936); Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran
Hosp., 256 Iowa 506, 128 N.W.2d 226 (1964); Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H.
203, 84 A.2d 918 (1952); Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J.
Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357 (Super. Ct, App. Div. 1963); Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M.
22, 63 P.2d 540 (1937); Candle v. Southern Ry. Co., 242 N.C. 466, 88 S.E.2d
138 (1955); Hansen v. Mayes, 175 Or. 358, 154 P.2d 202 (1944).
20. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 502 (1950 & Supp. 1973). Such damages
are allowed by Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Hawaii, Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Me.,
Md., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Okla., Or., Pa.,
Tex., and Wash. Id. at 502-05. Additionally, most courts have agreed that
if a parent has incurred funeral, medical or other expenses as a result of the
death of a child, an award may be made for such expenses as a part of the
pecuniary loss. Id. at 535.
21. Id. at 504. If the child had been supporting himself, the court may
eliminate this element from the consideration of the jury. Id.
22. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506-09 (1950 & Supp. 1973 & 1979); Decof,
supra note 17, at 198-99, 213-28. States that allow the recovery of post-
majority contributions include: Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Ill., Kan., Md.,
Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla., S.D.,
Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., and Wis. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506-09.
In a few jurisdictions it has been held that past systematic and. con-
sistent contributions to the parents by the deceased minor are a condition
[VOL. 27: p. 224
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In 1960, the Michigan Supreme Court, in the groundbreaking de-
cision of Wycko v. Gnodtke,23 relaxed the strict pecuniary approach to
damages for a child's wrongful death by holding that the loss of
companionship sustained by a parent as a result of a child's death is a
compensable loss. 2 4  The Wycko court examined the traditional
pecuniary loss rule and found it to be a product of the child-labor era.25
The court, conceding that the damages must be based upon the pecuniary
value of a human life, concluded that an individual member of a family
has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit.26
precedent to a recovery for the loss of such benefits after the child's majority.
See, e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 189 Ark. 69, 71 S.W.2d
180 (1934); Memphis, D. & G. Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 99 Ark. 422, 138 S.W.
965 (1911); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462, 18 S.W. 628
(1892); Gulf Refining Co. v. Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 121 So. 482 (1929); Cum-
berland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732, 41 So. 263 (1906). A
similar rationale has given rise to the rule that if a child was too young
at death to have earned wages, no award for post-majority contributions can
be made. See Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Parker, 200 Ark. 620, 140 S.W.2d
997, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940).
Another method of ascertaining damages for the wrongful death of a
child is the "lost investment" theory. See Decof, supra note 17, at 200-01.
With this approach, damages awarded to the surviving parents include funds
spent by them in rearing and caring for the child. Id. This theory was es-
tablished by the Michigan Supreme Court. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361
Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). In Wycko, the court held that damages
could be measured, in part, by "the expenses of birth, of food, of clothing,
of medicines, of instruction, of nurture, and shelter." Id. at 339, 105 N.W.2d
at 122.
23. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
24. Id. at 336, 105 N.W.2d at 122. Wycko was later overruled in Breckon
v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970). The Michigan
legislature responded by amending its wrongful death statute to include re-
covery for the loss of companionship. See MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2922
(Callaghan 1974).
25. 361 Mich. at 335-37, 105 N.W.2d at 120-21. The court stated:
It is not surprising that the courts of such a society should have
read into the statutory words "such damages as they [the jury]. may
think proportional to the injury resulting from such death" not only
the requirement of a pecuniary loss, but moreover, a pecuniary
loss established by a wage benefit-less-costs measure of damages.
Other losses were unreal and intangible and at this time in our legal
history the courts would have no truck with what Chief Baron Pollock
termed . . . "imaginary losses."
Id. at 336-37, 105 N.W.2d at 121, quoting Duckworth v. Johnson, 157 Eng.
Rep. 997 (Exch. 1859). The court expressed its dismay that the development
of the law in this area had failed to parallel the enlightened social conscience:
That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a parent
from the death of his child should control our decisions today is a
reproach to justice . . . . Yet there still exists in the law . . .prece-
dents we alone honor [which] tell us that the value of the life of
a child must be measured solely by the standards of the day when he
peddled the skill of his hands and the strength of his back at the
factory gates.
361 Mich. at 337-38, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
26. 361 Mich. at 339, 105 N.W.2d at 122.
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The Wycko court defined this value as "the value of mutual society and
protection, in a word, companionship." 27
Since the Wycko decision, several states have abrogated or modified
the traditional pecuniary loss rule by attaching pecuniary value to non-
economic interests, such as parents' loss of society and companionship,
as well as loss of care, guidance and support.28 A small number of states
expressly permit recovery for emotional injury in the wrongful death
of a child.
2 9
New Jersey subscribes to the majority rule 3 that recovery in any
wrongful death action is limited to pecuniary loss. 3 1 The two major
reasons advanced for not recognizing emotional harm as a basis for
compensation in wrongful death actions are the subjectivity of non-
corporal injuries82 and the fear that sympathetic juries will return
27. Id. at 339-40, 105 N.W.2d at 122 (footnote omitted).
28. See Belfance, supra note 17, at 553, 557-60; Decof, supra note 17, at
205-07. These states include Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Fla., Hawaii, Idaho,
Kan., La., Md., Mich., Minn., Miss., Neb., Nev., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Va.,
Vt., Wash., Wis., and Wyo. See also 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 498-500; 85 N.J. at
13 n.4, 424 A.2d at 216 n.4.
29. See Decof, supra note 17, at 206. The statutes of three states allow
recovery for mental anguish. Arkansas' wrongful death statute permits re-
covery for such damages as the jury may deem fair and just, including loss of
services and companionship of the spouse and/or mental anguish resulting
from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of the deceased.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1979). The Florida wrongful death statute pro-
vides: "Decedent's parent may recover, not only for loss of services of such
minor child, but also such sum for the mental pain and suffering of the
parent . . . as the jury may assess." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1964). Mary-
land's statute provides that damages may include compensation for "mental
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, com-
fort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, coun-
sel, training, guidance, or education where applicable." MD. ANN. CODE art.
67, § 4 (1957).
30. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. For the text of the New
Jersey Wrongful Death Act regarding damages, see note 3 supra.
31. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 308-09, 204 A.2d 140, 143-44
(1964); Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 405, 93 A.2d
190, 194-95 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952); Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L.
558, 567, 44 A. 633, 636 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899). In Cooper, the court stated that
"the pecuniary injury designated by the statute is nothing more than a depriva-
tion of a reasonable expectation of a pecuniary advantage which would have
resulted by a continuance of the life of the deceased." 63 N.J.L at 567, 44 A.
at 636.
32. See Decof, supra note 17, at 206. In recent years, however, most courts
have agreed that emotional distress is capable of medical proof. Note, Re-
covery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Permitted to Mother Who
Witnessed the Violent Death of her Child Even Though the Mother Was
Outside Line of Danger, 25 VILL. L. REv. 195, 197 n.13 (1979-1980). It should
be noted that a separate cause of action is available in New Jersey which
permits recovery for physical and emotional injuries sustained when a parent
actually witnesses a child's death. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d
521 (1980). See also Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1104 (1943).
[VOL. 27: p. 224
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excessive verdicts.88 Furthermore, until Green v. Bittner,54 New Jersey
was one of only a handful of states adhering to the traditional narrow
view of pecuniary loss. 35 Prior to the Green decision, the New Jersey
courts had consistently taken the position that damages in the wrongful
death of a child were to be measured by the deprivation of the probable
earnings of the child during minority and the services which the child
might have rendered during his minority, had he survived.3 6 May v.
West Jersey & S.R. Co.3 7 exemplifies the traditional approach. The
decedent in May was a fifteen year old boy who, at the time of his
death, had an earning capacity of about twenty dollars per month.38
The court held that the father's recovery was limited to the damages
represented by the boy's earning capacity until he reached his majority,
and not beyond that time.3 9
In the second half of this century, New Jersey courts began to make
inroads on the strict pre-majority lost wages and services rule by allowing
juries to consider evidence concerning the possibility of post-majority
direct financial help to survivors. 40 McStay v. Przychocki 41 involved the
wrongful death of two boys, aged ten and twelve.42 The court stated
that the probable earnings of the two boys during their minority were
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 907-08.
34. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210.
35. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
36. See, e.g., Wimberly v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d
691 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962); Clifford v. McCloskey, 13 N.J. Super. 96, 80
A.2 134 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951).
37. 62 N.J.L. 67, 42 A. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
38. Id. at 67, 42 A. at 165.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 405,
93 A.2d 190, 194-95 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952). In Bohrman, the decedent was
an eighteen year old who worked in her father's beauty shop and assisted her
mother with the cooking, cleaning, washing, ironing, and care of the house.
Id. at 401-02, 93 A.2d at 191. In finding that an award of $15,000 for her
death was not excessive, the Bohrman court stated:
Not only were her parents deprived of her probable earnings
during her minority . . . but they were also deprived of the reason-
able expectancy of contributions of a pecuniary nature which decedent
might have made after reaching her majority. These are proper ele-
ments to be considered together with the loss of direct services,
having a money value, which would have been rendered during the
minority in and about the home and beauty shop.
Id. at 408, 93 A.2d at 195.
41. 7 N.J. 456, 81 A.2d 761 (1951).
42. Id. at 456, 81 A.2d at 763. The two boys were described by the
court as bright, healthy, normal boys, who did well in school, actively helped
with the work in and about the home, and assisted in caring for the younger
children. Id. at 460, 81 A.2d at 763. During the summer preceding his
death, the twelve year old had earned between three and five dollars per week
as a newspaper boy. Id. On these facts, the McStay court sustained a verdict
of $6,000 as damages for the death of each child. Id. at 464, 81 A.2d at 765.
1981-82]
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proper elements of damage, as was the estimated value of direct services
they might have rendered their mother during their minority.43 In
addition, the court found that damages based on a reasonable expecta-
tion of financial contributions which the boys might have made after
reaching their majority could also be awarded.
44
Until the Green decision, the pecuniary loss of a child's anticipated
companionship or support was not regarded as compensable by the
New Jersey courts.4 5 And, recognizing the limitations imposed by the
New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute,46 which restricts recovery to
pecuniary loss, 47 the New Jersey courts have uniformly denied com-
pensation for emotional loss sustained by parents.
48
Against this background, Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the
court, addressed the correctness of the jury instructions given in Green 49
and decided that the focus on the value of household chores 50 was sub-
stantially in accord with decisional law.6 1 He noted, however, that case
law did not preclude an instruction concerning the pecuniary value of
the companionship and advice which the decedent might have rendered
her parents in later years.
2
43. Id. at 459, 81 A.2d at 764.
44. Id. at 462, 81 A.2d at 764.
45. 85 N.J. at 9, 424 A.2d at 214. No cases prior to Green v. Bittner can
be found in which the court has discussed the possibility of separating the
economic elements of companionship and support from the non-economic ele-
ments of damages.
46. See 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-1 to 31-6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1981).
47. For the text of the section governing damages, see note 3 supra.
48. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964). The Graf
court declared "[our] courts have consistently construed pecuniary loss to
exclude damages for mental suffering and loss of society." Id. at 308-09, 204
A.2d at 144. See, e.g., McStay v. Przychocki, 7 N.J. 456, 460, 81 A.2d 761,
763 (1951); Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J. Super. 351, 369, 225 A.2d 742, 752
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1966); Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 23 N.J. Super.
399, 405, 93 A.2d 190, 193 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
New Jersey courts have, however, allowed recovery for emotional injury
to parents in at least two areas of tort law. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J.
88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (allowing father to recover damages for emotional
injury suffered as the result of witnessing his child's death); Magee v. Holland,
27 N.J.L. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1856) (allowing father to recover damages to redress his
wounded feelings following the abduction of his three children).
49. 85 N.J. at 6-7, 424 A.2d at 212-13.
50. See note 5 supra.
51. 85 N.J. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212; see notes 40-48 and accompanying text
supra. The court suggested that the limits on parental recovery may be at
least partially due to the "apparent absence in infant death cases of the kind
of expert testimony that might have helped courts to perceive a greater ex-
tent of loss than previously recognized." 85 N.J. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215. For
a discussion of the current use of expert testimony to prove damages for the
wrongful death of a child, see Decof, supra note 17, at 207-11.
52. 85 N.J. at 7, 424 A.2d at 213. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); McStay v. Przychocki, 7 N.J. 456, 81 A.2d 761
(1951); Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L 558, 44 A. 633 (Ct. Err. & App.
1899); Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
[VOL. 27. p. 224
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Chief Justice Wilentz, in considering the desirability of express ap-
proval of recovery for loss of companionship and advice, proceeded to
discuss the double standard that exists in measuring damages in wrong-
ful death cases.53 In contrast to the limited recovery available to a
parent in the event of a child's death, 54 children have long been able to
recover the pecuniary value of the guidance and counsel lost as a result
of the parent's death.f5 The court noted that this double standard was
not statutorily. mandated, 56 and that the desire to abolish it was probably
a significant factor in the expansion of recovery for the wrongful death
of a child in other states.57 The court also found that the concern with
the inability to place a monetary value on a child's companionship and
advice is no longer persuasive in view of the fact that damages are
regularly awarded in wrongful death cases despite these difficulties. 58
Chief Justice Wilentz went on to say that just as the law recognizes that
a child may continue to perform household services for, and make
financial contributions to, his parents after reaching his majority, it
1966); Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952). Noting that counsel for the plaintiff had not re-
quested such an instruction, Chief Justice Wilentz commented that in no prior
case had an attorney attempted to separate the emotional from the pecuniary as-
pects of loss of society and companionship and seek recovery for the latter. 85
.J. at 18, 424 A.2d at 219.
53. 85 N.J. at 7-9, 424 A.2d at 213.
54. See notes 35-48 and accompanying text supra.
55. 85 N.J. at 7-8, 424 A.2d at 213.
56. Id. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215. In New Jersey, as in most states, there
is no special statute for the wrongful death of a child; wrongful death actions
for the death of a parent or child are tried under the same wrongful death
statute. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902.
57. 85'N.J. at 7, 424 A.2d at 213.
58. 85 N.J. at 15, 424 A.2d at 217. Chief Justice Wilentz stressed that
New Jersey courts currently allow pecuniary damages for the prospective
loss of a child's wages and household services even though such loss is specu-
lative and the damages difficult to estimate. Id., citing Cooper v. Shore
Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 567, 44 A. 633, 636 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899); Paul-
mier v. Erie R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 151, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1870); McStay v. Przychocki,
10 N.J. Super. 455, 458, 77 A.2d 276, 278 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950). More-
over, Chief Justice Wilentz added, when a parent dies, loss of advice, guidance
and counsel is allowed to the surviving children without any showing that the
parent had actually been rendering valuable advice or was likely to do so.
85 N.J. at 15, 424 A.2d at 217. In both types of cases, he observed, "the
proof that suffices is the parent-child relationship and what we assume the
jury can conclude from that relationship alone." Id. Chief Justice Wilentz
declared that "[i]t will be up to the jury to decide what services would have
been rendered, and what their value is, subject to no more or no less control,
direction, and guidance from the court than occurs in other wrongful death
cases." Id. at 16, 424 A.2d at 218. However, he observed, the use of an
expert, as well as such detailed information concerning family circumstances
as is available, could be most helpful in these, as in all, wrongful death cases.
Id. at 17, 424 A.2d at 218. The Chief Justice concluded that the jury should
not be left to pure conjecture on these matters. Id.
.1981-82].
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should similarly recognize that a child may provide valuable companion-
ship and care to his parents if or when they become aged or infirm. 9
Having concluded that there was no persuasive reason not to allow
parents to recover for the loss of a child's companionship and advice,
the court considered the correct measure of damages. 60 The Chief
Justice stressed that recovery would be limited to the pecuniary element
of companionship and advice, 1 despite the fact that such a limitation
denies a parent compensation for his emotional suffering, which is the
true loss.6 2 He explained that the limitation is one of legislative man-
date and that the judiciary does not have the discretion to waive it.63
The court proceeded to analyze: 1) the pecuniary value to be placed
on a child's companionship, 64 and 2) the value to be placed on a child's
advice and guidance.0 The court held, as a matter of law, that the
value of a child's companionship compensable under the wrongful death
statute is the fair market cost of comparable companionship purchased
from a stranger. 66 This element of companionship was defined as those
services "substantially equivalent to those provided by the 'companions'
often hired today by the aged or infirm, or substantially equivalent to
services provided by nurses or practical nurses." 67 Chief Justice Wilentz
59. 85 N.J. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215. Moreover, in the Chief Justice's view,
the loss of companionship and advice which a parent suffers upon the death
of a child is sometimes as great as that suffered by a child upon a parent's
death. Id. at 11-12, 424 A.2d at 215.
60. Id. at 12-17, 424 A.2d at 215-18.
61. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215.
62. Id. at 12-13, 424 A.2d at 216. Chief Justice Wilentz noted that, given
New Jersey's vastly expanded scope of tort liability and of recoverable dam-
ages, there is no public policy which would prohibit awarding damages to
fully compensate for the emotional loss and suffering caused by a child's
death. Id. at 13, 424 A.2d at 216. Moreover, the court observed that as
early as 1964, the New Jersey Supreme Court had taken note of the growing
number of jurisdictions which had abandoned the pecuniary loss rule alto-
gether or interpreted pecuniary loss to cover such items as loss of society or
companionship. Id. at 13 n.4, 424 A.2d at 216 n.4, citing Graf v. Taggert,
43 N.J. 303, 308-09 n.l, 204 A.2d 140, 143 n.l (1964).
63. 85 N.J. at 13, 424 A.2d at 216.
64. Id. at 12-13, 424 A.2d at 215-16.
65. Id. at 14, 424 A.2d at 216-17.
66. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215-16. Chief Justice Wilentz added that no
compensation can be allowed for the parents' lost prospective emotional
satisfaction that would have been derived from the child's performance of
caretaking and companionship services, as opposed to that of a stranger. Id.
at 12, 424 A.2d at 216. The court noted that even though "such pleasure
will often be the primary value of the child's service, indeed, in reality, its
most beneficial aspect," the loss of this type of satisfaction is more akin to
emotional suffering than to pecuniary loss and thus cannot be recovered under
the statute. Id. at 12-13, 424 A.2d at 216.
67. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215. Chief .Justice Wilentz carefully scrutinized
the type of lost services to which a pecuniary value could be attached:
Hired companions today perform a variety of services, primarily,
however, simply keeping the employer company and administering
to basic needs. They may prepare and serve meals, do grocery shop-
9
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maintained that to allow for the pecuniary loss of a child's companion-
ship is consistent with prior decisions and is an extension of recovery
only in the sense that prior cases had not explicitly recognized this
element of damage.68 The court also held, as a matter of law, that the
value of a child's advice, guidance and counsel is the fair market cost
of similar services purchased from a professional. 9
Chief Justice Wilentz concluded by predicting that allowing juries
under appropriate circumstances to award damages for the parents' loss
of their child's companionship and advice will result in verdicts which
will more closely reflect the actual pecuniary losses suffered.' 0 The Chief
Justice noted that in the past, juries have wanted to give awards to
parents for emotional loss, but having been instructed that they could
not, have often set an unrealistically high value on household chores.71
It is submitted that given the statutory constraints placed on the
Green court,72 Chief Justice Wilentz appropriately modified New Jersey's
approach to compensation for the wrongful death of a child. In allow-
ing recovery for loss of companionship and advice,78 New Jersey has
joined the ranks of progressive and forward looking jurisdictions.74
ping, perform other errands, keep the home tidy, give medicines,
make telephone calls, and generally make themselves useful-includ-
ing making it possible for the employer to be outdoors. Care given
by children to aging and infirm parents is often indistinguishable
from those services. Children also often provide many of the services
ordinarily rendered by practical nurses, such as bathing the bedridden,
changing bandages, moving an immobilized patient, administering
medication, spoon-feeding invalids, preparing special meals, keeping a
sickroom tidy-even removing visitors if they tire the invalid.
Id. at 12 n.2, 424 A.2d at 215 n.2.
68. Id. at 17-18, 424 A.2d at 218. See note 52 and accompanying text
supra.
69. 85 N.J. at 14, 424 A.2d at 216-17. As with the loss of companionship,
Chief Justice Wilentz maintained that compensable loss in this regard is devoid
of emotional elements: "[I]t is certainly not the loss of the pleasure which
accompanies such an exchange [which is compensable] . . . . It must be the
kind of advice, guidance or counsel that could be purchased from a business
adviser, a therapist, or a trained counselor, for instance." Id.
70. Id. at 19, 424 A.2d at 219.
71. Id. at 18-19, 424 A.2d at 219. The court noted that juries often at-
tempt to "find a way to do some kind of justice despite the judge's charge."
Id. at 19, 424 A.2d at 219. Chief Justice Wilentz remarked:
A compassionate jury, wanting to give the parents something sub-
stantial for their emotional loss but being told, in effect, that the
measure of recovery is the value of the household chores that might
have been performed less the future cost to the parents of maintaining
the child, is inclined to set an unrealistically high value on those
household chores. A more conscientious jury will add up the num-
bers and come in with zero.
Id. at 18-19, 424 A.2d at 219.
72. See note 3 supra.
73. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
74. For a list of states which allow recovery for parental loss of interests
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It is suggested, however, that allowing recovery for the pecuniary value
of a child's lost wages, services, companionship and advice, but not for
the emotional suffering occasioned by the child's death, is a sorely in-
adequate remedy, albeit the only one within the power of the New
Jersey judiciary to award. 75
It is submitted that the New Jersey legislature should modify the
present Wrongful Death Statute to explicitly permit recovery for non-
pecuniary losses. 7 6 It is suggested that disturbance or destruction of
the family relationship should be an element of damages.77 Courts have
recognized that a child is an integral part of the family unit,7 8 and
there is precedent in other areas of the law for allowing recovery for
interference with the family relationship.
7 9
It is further suggested that compensatory damages should be allowed
for the emotional harm suffered as a result of a child's death. Sub-
jective measurement of emotional harm suffered is not beyond the scope
of present psychological knowledge s 0 Moreover, New Jersey courts
have allowed recovery for emotional distress in other tort actions.8 1
75. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
76. This is not to suggest that pecuniary damages should be eliminated.
In a relatively small percentage of cases parents do suffer an economic loss
upon the death of a child. Children killed near the end of minority often
are employed and make financial contributions to the family or have indicated
the intent to do so. Moreover, in exceptional cases, contributions to the
family are established at a relatively early age and are capable of proof.
77. See Decof, supra note 17, at 206-07.
78. See Wycko v. Gnotke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). The
Hycko court stated:
[J]ust as an item of machinery forming part of a functioning indus-
trial plant has a value over and above that of a similar item in a
showroom, awaiting purchase, so an individual member of a family
has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic
unit.
Id. at 339, 105 N.W.2d at 122.
79. Decof, supra note 17, at 206-07. For example, parents have been al-
lowed to recover damages for injury sustained because of the abduction or
seduction of their child. Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1856).
One commentator has stated that "[a]lthough various rationales have been
employed by the courts in [abduction or seduction] cases, it can reasonably
be argued that common to them all is the principle of compensating parents
for the temporary loss of the child, its companionship, its society, in other
words, the disturbance of the family relationship." Decof, supra note 17,
at 207.
80. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damages, 20 Micia. L.
REV. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Note, Recovery for Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress Permitted to Mother Who Witnessed the Violent Death of her
Child Even Though the Mother Was Outside Line of Danger, 25 VILL. L. REV.
195, 197 n.13 (1979-1980). Most courts, including New Jersey's, agree that emo-
tional distress is capable of medical proof. See Carter v. Public Service Coord.
Transport, 47 N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
81. See notes 48 &c 80 supra.
[VOL. 27: p. 224
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It is submitted that recovery for the emotional loss occasioned by a
child's death is less speculative than recovery for pecuniary loss because
emotional injury, unlike pecuniary loss, can be assessed by looking at
the parent-child relationship at the time of the child's death, without
speculating about future events.
8 2
It is further submitted that a more stabilizing effect on jury awards
would result if the pecuniary loss rule were dropped in favor of an all-
inclusive recovery rule.8 8 Effective legislation could promote uniformity
by removing the conflict between rule of law and the impulse of emotion
with which juries must struggle in pecuniary loss jurisdictions.
8 4
The Green court, by continuing to allow juries to compensate for
a parent's emotional loss under the guise of compensating for purely
pecuniary loss, albeit the only loss recognizable under New Jersey's
Wrongful Death Act,"' will lend little credibility to future wrongful
death awards.88
82. Pecuniary loss, on the other hand, must be assessed by speculation as
to such factors as the child's longevity, the parent's longevity, the earning
capacity of the child, the possibility that the child, had he lived, would have
rendered services, financial aid, companionship or advice to his parents, and
the value of such services. For a listing of the elements of proof which are
usually material in an assessment of pecuniary loss in child death cases, see
Decof, supra note 17, at 199. For a discussion of Chief Justice Wilentz's
reasoning that pecuniary damages in wrongful death cases are highly specula-
tive, see note 58 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Finkelstein, Pickrel, & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Non-
parametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 884, 892-93 (1974). In a nonparametric study conducted to evaluate the
effect that statutes expressly providing for recovery for emotional injury have
on the size of jury awards, it was found that there is a greater variance in
awards in pecuniary loss states than in states which expressly allow recovery
for emotional injury. Id. An examination of a sampling of large and small
awards indicates that the intermittent application of the pecuniary loss rule
is the cause of the variance: "When it is applied, the awards are very small[;]
when it is 'winked at' by judge and jury bent on doing higher justice, the
awards are very large." Id. at 892. Prosser has observed that:
As any parent is well aware, any realistic view of the prospects must
mean that the cost of rearing the child will far exceed any conceivable
pecuniary benefits that might ever be optimistically expected of
him; and damages honestly calculated on this basis could never be
anything but a minus quantity. Nevertheless, in such cases substan-
tial verdicts have been sustained, where it is very evident that the
jury have taken the bull by the horns, and in reality have com-
pensated for the prohibited sentimental aspects of the family rela-
tion, with the court benevolently winking at the flagrant violation of
the rule it has laid down.
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 908-09.
84. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
85. For the pertinent portion of the Wrongful Death Act, see note 3
supra.
86. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 909. Prosser comments that such
rule-bending "[does] not appear very likely to command respect for the ad-
ministration of justice; but it seems evident that it is the theory which is
wrong, and not the result." Id.
1981-82]
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The Green court has, it is suggested, begun the task of freeing itself
from a rule lacking both logic and express statutory support.8 7 How-
ever, a-legislative enactment is long overdue which will more adequately
compensate the harm suffered by a parent when a child is killed. It is
asserted that the better view would be to allow a jury to award com-
pensatory damages for whatever harm has occurred-emotional or eco-
nomic, or both 81 Such an approach would allow an honest assessment
of the real impact which results from the death of a child.
Beverly A. Myers
87. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
88. The court would retain its power to control improper jury verdicts.
See Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish
of Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REv. 1, 19
(1976).
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